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POLICY ANALYSIS PAPERS |
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Considering Nuclear Earth Penetrators Shelly Williams, July 12, 2004 For the third year in a row, the Bush Administration has submitted to Congress a budget that requests monies ($27.6 million for 2005) for research into the possible creation of a new class of nuclear weapons. Variously described as “mini-nukes,” “bunker busters,” and “usable nuclear weapons,” the official title for this program is Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) and it is part of the Department of Energy’s Advanced Concepts Program (ACP). No matter what they are called, policy advocates or critics call these weapons either a dramatic and dangerous departure from traditional US nuclear policy or a rational adjustment of US weaponry to a post Cold War environment of terrorism and a presumed diminished capacity to deter potential adversaries. The purpose of this article is to review the cases for and against the RNEP and to inform the reader of the role that the issue will play in election year 2004 politics. As a backdrop to this discussion, it is important to note that the end of the Cold War did not lead to the elimination of either the United States’ or Russia’s nuclear weapons programs. First the Clinton Administration and then the Bush Administration reached agreements with Russia to cut back these weapons gradually, but both countries have substantial arsenals (between 20,000 and 30,000 together) today (http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2004/June_04.asp). In addition other Cold War Powers – China, the UK, and France – continue to maintain nuclear weapons, and India and Pakistan since 1998 have publicly developed them. Israel is presumed to have an arsenal of around two hundred nuclear weapons and both Iran and the Democratic Republic of Korea have on again, off again programs that most experts assume have produced, or someday will produce, nuclear weapons. Of course, another state, Iraq, had a nuclear weapons program disrupted by the first Gulf War and whether or not it had substantially reconstituted that program played a major role in the announced US decision for attacking Iraq in 2003. Libya, which struck a deal with the International Atomic Energy Agency in May (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/libya/iaea0504.pdf) to forgo its program, and Syria have also at times been suggested as other states wishing to move toward nuclear weapons acquisition. The emergence of global terrorism as the US’ central strategic problem forms another level of concern about Weapons of Mass Destruction generally and nuclear weapons in particular. The 9/11 Commission’s revelation that al-Qaida “planners” considered overtaking a Russian missile site to fire a strategic weapon at the United States is a chilling reminder that certain groups do in fact spend considerable time plotting how to conduct mass murder in the US. A scenario that researchers at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterrey California (http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040618.htm) describe as “likely” involves terrorists acquiring uranium or plutonium, fashioning it into a “dirty bomb,” and detonating it in a major US city. Virtually all experts and politicians agree that if these groups could acquire nuclear weapons, they would use them. Considerations of protecting innocent civilians, avoiding their own destruction, or only using nuclear weapons in retaliation would not appear as factors in the decision-making process of a radical group or groups intent on “punishing” the United States for is policies or for its continued support for Israel. Such assumptions can lead to the notion that deterrence no longer “works” as the centerpiece of US nuclear weapons policies. Deterrence theory presumes that a state must be able to retaliate against an enemy with assured overwhelming force such that the enemy will not consider a first attack “rational.” This notion was captured in the phrase Mutual Assured Destruction and the assumption was that no state would fire nuclear weapons first if it only meant mutual assured suicide. Today in a world of suicide bombers and non-state actors, the Mutual Assured Destruction concept appears antiquated. Moreover, the ability to hide weapons underground may provide adversaries the ability to conceal the very existence of the weapons designed to commit massive destruction in the US or against its allies. Government and non-Government sources alike report the existence of thousands of underground facilities in as many as seventy countries and as many as fourteen hundred sites along the DMZ in Korea alone. The catch phrase for these underground sites has become “bunkers” and their detection, defeat, and destruction have been much on the minds of military planners in the CIA and the Department of Defense. Thus, the rationale for the Bush Administration’s Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator program would appear rather straightforward. John Gordon of the National Nuclear Security Administration before the House Armed services Committee states the case clearly: “…[C]urrent weapons in the stockpile cannot hold at risk a growing category of potential targets deeply buried in tunnel facilities, possibly containing chemical, biological, nuclear, or command and control facilities.” Therefore, the Administration calls for a “modest” research program for a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator that assesses the feasibility of adopting two current weapons in the US arsenal, the B61 and the B83, for possible use against hard rock geologies and other “hardened” sites. Gordon and other members of the Administration have been at great pains to argue that this program does not constitute the development of a new “mini-nuke program” and that it does not necessitate the resumption of nuclear testing—yet. The broader picture for this program naturally involves the Administration’s National Security Policy (http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html) and its Nuclear Posture Review (http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html). According to the documents, the US will protect itself but it will also assertively initiate the use of force to preempt an emerging threat as well. The Administration has proved itself willing, under the new strategic environment, to reject possible nuclear constraints called for by earlier arms control agreements like the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban or the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty. It has also backed away from pursuing the kinds of verifiable agreements with Russia that were once the heart of the arms control effort. It remains committed, however, to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency that verifies Non-Nuclear Weapons States’ compliance with it (though the Administration has publicly doubted the IAEA’s abilities in the area). The President’s Proliferation Security Initiative (the subject of this author’s next piece) stresses both multilateral and unilateral actions the Administration will take to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Administration sees no incompatibility between the RNEP program and its arms control commitments. Critics do. In a nutshell, arms control advocates cast doubts on several aspects of the case for the RNEP. Often the rationale for “bunker busters” is the emergence of global terrorism, but the cases cited of extensive tunnels and new weapons programs in nuclear weapons, missile delivery systems, and other weapons of mass destruction are as often as not states –Iran, Iraq, North Korea, even Russia – to which traditional notions of deterrence still largely adhere. Even in cases where it might not, critics wonder what the political consequences would be of initiating the use of nuclear weapons against facilities that would no doubt be placed close to population centers and for which levels of collateral damage and nuclear fall out could be severe. This is further compounded by the notion that finding the right bunkers with the right weapons at the right time might be physically impossible. The consequences of an “accidental” nuclear strike against an empty bunker seem daunting. Nuclear as opposed to conventional preemption would “cross the nuclear threshold”; would violate US policy not to use nuclear weapons unless the US or one of its allies were attacked by a WMD; and would likely lead to a new nuclear arms race for usable nukes by many states. If the current studies are not sufficient and actual testing of nuclear weapons are necessary, the US would not only violate the purpose of the CTBT, it would require it to change its own domestic legislation banning testing in force since 1992. Such action by the United States would no doubt lead to a reversal of the worldwide ban against testing nuclear weapons. Critics in fact argue that nuclear bunker busters are not the appropriate weapons of choice against the current set of threats. More important and under-funded are the programs to make secure current nuclear weapons, to limit the access of terrorists to nuclear materials, and to develop strong multilateral approaches to detection and diversion of nuclear materials, equipment, and weapons. If the United States continues down the path of the RNEP, mini-nukes, and possible nuclear testing, other major players, especially Russia and China, will see these developments as potentially threatening to their own deterrent postures and respond accordingly. Thus, there is fear that the Bush Administration has brought the world to the break of a new nuclear arms race, replete with nuclear tests and unraveling arms control treaties. The Administration, according to its critics, is adopting a unilateralist policy that funds a technically dubious program at a cost not only of millions of dollars but one that threatens US diplomatic standing and a number of essential arms control treaties. Thus, the stakes are high in the debate regarding RNEP and any follow-on program that might result from it. Journals like the “National Review” contend that no foreign policy issue more clearly separates the two main candidates for President than this particular one. Bush, of course, supports the program. John Kerry, on the other hand, joins the critics in declaring that: “I am opposed to the Bush Administration’s attempts to develop new nuclear weapons. I denounced an Administration-backed proposal approved by the Senate to fund research into a new generation of nuclear weapons known as “mini-nukes” and “bunker-busters.” Developing these smaller and more usable nuclear weapons will make America less secure by setting back our country's longstanding efforts to lead an international non-proliferation regime. It could set off a dangerous new nuclear arms race, while seriously undermining our ability to work with the international community to address nuclear proliferation threats in places like North Korea and Iran.” The conservative “National Review” suggests that Kerry would unilaterally disarm a whole class of nuclear weapons and risk exposing the American people to terrorists’ nuclear threats (http://www.nationalreview.com/kerry/kerry200406020904.asp). Naturally during the campaign, Republicans will be at pains to show that Kerry is “soft” on defense and will cite his opposition to RNEP as an example. Democrats, on the other hand, will argue that the Bush Administration is “reckless” and is undermining time-tested multilateral approaches. Election year rhetoric will not determine the fate of RNEP, however. The candidates will use the program as illustration of proof of their own “dominant cliché” about the other’s tendencies or weaknesses, but ultimately the fate of the program will lie in the hands of the branch of government that determines the final budget of the US Government: the US Congress. What is apt NOT to be emphasized in the upcoming months is that the Congress itself is not yet entirely convinced that RNEP is a good way to go. While the Senate and House have both narrowly, along partisan lines, approved RNEP’s funding solely as a research program thus far, Congress reduced by half the Administration’s request in FY 2004 (from $15 M to $7.5 M). This year’s defense budget has yet to be reconciled between the House and Senate versions, but just in June 2004 the Republican-controlled House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water entirely omitted the RNEP funding request and monies for testing readiness. This is far from the end of the story, of course. RNEP may ultimately be funded this year at a lower level than the Administration requested as the House and Senate take joint action on the 2005 budget bill, but again only as a research study. An Administration request to test or develop, much less deploy, such weapons lies well into the future and would be extremely controversial. Prominent and obvious Senate Democrats such as Ted Kennedy (MA) and Diane Feinstein (CA) oppose bunker busters, but so do Senate Republican, John Chafee (RI), and prominent House Republicans David Hopson (O), and Curt Weldon (PA). If RNEP ever moves beyond a research proposal to actual development, arms control advocates believe that many more Republicans will break with the Administration to oppose the program. From a policy point of view, while we may be early in the stages of this debate, RNEP is a prelude to a broader national debate on much more substantial issues. In the next few years, expect heated Congressional discussion and debate on usable nukes, testing renewal, and possibly new nuclear weapons programs. It will all be part of how the US as the world’s greatest power determines how to respond to the changing global environment and what weapons to place in its arsenal while preserving its place as a world leader. This debate is not too scientific to be remote to the layman and it should not be limited to “military experts.” It will be AMCIPS’ goal to update its members on the debate, on the military thinking behind any new programs, or on the reasons why any programs are scuttled or redirected. At this point and from this author’s viewpoint, the argument against RNEP seems persuasive because the Administration has yet to demonstrate that the weapon is consistent with the threat terrorists pose or the diplomatic fallout that its development would generate. Nevertheless, it is likely to creep forward if the Republicans maintain control of both houses of Congress and if for a while the project is limited to a research effort exclusively. What comes next, however, should concern us all, and we will try to keep you informed of the issues involved.
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