WINNING ESSAY

For Elisabeth’s Children: Approaching the Dilemma of Humanitarian Interventions
By Annie Hsieh

Annie Hsieh
United States Military Academy, West Point

There I sat, in the middle of a cramped, deteriorating apartment room, in the poorest section of Durban, South Africa, talking the cool afternoon away with the four refugee women I had just met earlier.  They had invited me to spend the afternoon with them, curious to talk to an American, much more a female officer-to-be in the United States Army.  I had already spent a few hours listening to their alarming, heartbreaking stories of witnessing the deaths of their loved ones in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo, and answering their endless questions about America and being a woman in the military, when Elisabeth’s question silenced the room.

Looking at me with innocent curiosity, she asked, “Annie, you are part of the most powerful army in the world—why does not the U.S. help our situation?  There is so much bloodshed still—can America do nothing?”

Her earnest plea echoed off the walls…Why did the United States do nothing during those horrific months of 1994 in Rwanda…and practically nothing still nearly 10 years later?  Why did Solange, sitting across from me, have to lose eleven of her family members in the Rwandan genocides, not to mention the similar losses of the two ladies sitting next to me—Petronille and Annonciata—in their own  countries’ respective civil conflicts?

After a moment of searching for a better answer than the one I had, I finally replied, “It…is complicated.”  Then, using my best tact in an attempt to cast the United States in as moral a light as possible, I continued to explain, awkwardly, inadequately, almost ashamedly, why involving ourselves in such situations simply did not always serve our national interests.

The end of the Cold War marked a fundamental change in America’s security imperatives, as our focus shifted from deterring the threat of Communist expansion to preventing the emergence of a new threat.  A number of nation-states that were once held intact by the ideological standoff between the Eastern and Western blocs during the Cold War have since “gone bankrupt, and chaos exists.”[i]  The result has been a significant rise in regional conflicts throughout the world.  Although these deadly intrastate conflicts may not directly threaten US national security, they do have other serious costs worth considering.  Humanitarian crises result in a significant toll of unjustified deaths, produce both financial and ideological support for terrorist groups, keep countries mired in economic misery, and cause massive refugee movements.  Such damaging consequences not only create moral challenges to the common western argument that democracies protect and promote human rights, but threaten international security, potentially affecting the domestic stability and security of other countries.

            The hegemonic role of the United States in international politics since the end of the Cold War further accentuates the moral and strategic relevance of humanitarian operations to our national security policy.  G. John Ikenberry aptly describes our situation today as the world’s sole superpower:

The world is left with a confusing combination of new norms, old institutions, unipolar power, uncertain leadership, and declining political authority within the international community.  Meanwhile, the United States – the one country with both the greatest political assets and the greatest liabilities in the service of concerted international action – is caught in its own debates about its interests and obligations within the international order.[ii]

In light of the goals of the United States National Security Policy in 2002, which asserts that the United States will, among many things, champion aspirations for human dignity, work with others to defuse regional conflicts, and expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy, it is evident that formulating policy regarding humanitarian and peace operations has become increasingly important in our national interest.[iii]

            Nevertheless, in spite of the various ways in which regional conflicts may indirectly affect US national security, cases in which military intervention may be the only way to prevent human slaughter often do not concern, and may even oppose, the nation’s vital interests.  Our dilemma arises when certain absolute moral imperatives call us to act without regard to, or even against, our own national interests.  For example, genocide—the mass extermination of a certain group of people—should be recognized as universally immoral and, as philosopher Edmund Burke once wrote, “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.”  However, American foreign policy has traditionally followed realist “power politics” thinking, where national interests always overrule humanitarian ones.  Hence, in the 1994 Rwanda genocides, the United States refrained from taking action when over half a million were slaughtered by primitive methods in a period of six weeks, 15,700 cases of rape were reported (although the actual figure may have been 250,000 to 500,000), and tens of thousands, possibly hundreds of thousands, murdered with their own hands.[iv]  The extremity of the genocide in Rwanda serves not only as an example of universal moral injustice, but shows how humanitarian crises are wrought with moral complications for other countries that do have an ethical responsibility to intervene.

            The fact is, as a nation, the United States can no longer choose ignore certain global moral imperatives.  Those who have the capability have a moral obligation to intervene in certain cases, even when national interests are not at stake.  At the same time, a nation should never heedlessly dive into every humanitarian crisis simply because the perceived injustice is emotionally appalling.  Leaders who act purely from emotional humanitarian reasons may risk overstraining the nation’s resources, which may actually cause more damage than good, while neglecting their primary responsibility of serving the interests of its citizens. 

            Instead, we must carefully approach each situation by considering a variety of factors.  First, we must look closely at the need or problem at hand.  Often, our efforts at intervening in humanitarian crises falter because we fail to assess adequately the problem in the first place.  By understanding the context of the conflict or humanitarian crisis, we can better formulate possible solutions.  Every crisis is different, and most humanitarian needs do not require full-fledged military interventions.  In fact, we need to invest more in pursuing non-forcible solutions, such as diplomacy or funding or other types of aid, until such measures are exhausted.  Responding differently to various crises can be and has been criticized as “selective”; however, such selectivity may in fact be, in the words of Mark Evans, “necessary and desirable”:

The fact that we cannot intervene to prevent every violation of human rights, or even to prevent every case of genocide, is…no reason why we should not intervene where we can, even if the choice of when to do so is determined by pragmatic considerations or by the accidents of geography.[v]

Although it would be theoretically sound if we could consistently undertake interventions in all comparable cases, doing so is practically impossible, even for the United States.  It is necessary then that we scrutinize every humanitarian crisis before deciding what actions to take.

In examining each specific case, we then must decide whether or not humanitarian interests override national interests in each instance.  We should accept though, that, in reality, governments act from a mixture of motives.  As Kenneth Roth argues, “purely altruistic interventions are probably rare and should not be required.  We should insist on military action guided foremost by a human rights rationale, not on an absence of other motivating factors.”[vi]  When motives of national interest come into conflict with the implementation of humanitarian and human rights objectives, we need to ensure the latter takes precedence if we are to use human rights rationale as justification for our military action.

Next, we must consider our own capabilities: if a military intervention is in fact necessary, are we capable of successfully carrying it out?  What are the costs and commitments involved, and are we willing to pay?  In Somalia, “nobody conditioned the American people to the prospect of losing troops on a humanitarian mission.  When it happened the American people were outraged and wanted to pull them out.  Assessing risks should be an integral part of the decision-making process.”[vii]  We need to enter every military operation with the expectation that our troops will be required to interact with non-combatants in situations involving humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, or state-building, and moreover, work with civilian agencies in addressing such situations.

Lastly, we must set clear objectives and prioritize them, tying them to a definite exit strategy.  For example, the Iraqi War was initiated as a unilateral effort without clear objectives or an exit strategy, and today, the Bush administration finds itself mired in reconstruction efforts and still without U.N. support, as insurgent attacks increase against our troops.  Policymakers must assert what we want to achieve before we leave a humanitarian or peace operation.  Otherwise, we run the risk of worsening the problem without having achieved our objectives because we have left too soon or stayed too long.  Most, if not all, exit strategies in humanitarian operations should involve a transition from military control of the situation to civilian control, such as through NGOs and local officials.  Fundamentally, the military cannot and should not nation-build.  However, according to Adam Roberts, “If the practice of the 1990s has proved anything it is that humanitarian assistance cannot realistically be considered in isolation from security.”[viii]  We must create a policy that enables the military to provide security and direct assistance to NGO work in peace operations, while allowing NGOs the ability to forge long-term relationships within divided societies.

Humanitarian interventions are inherently complex, on both moral and practical levels.  Nevertheless, simply because there is no clear and simple way to approach the dilemma at hand does not mean we should abandon all attempts at addressing situations of humanitarian crisis.  Instead, we must realize that although there is no perfect solution, we should still resolve to do our best in meeting both our national and moral-humanitarian obligations.

A man once asked Senator John McCain, “Why did my son have to die in Somalia?”  Senator McCain used the question in an article to further his point that the United States should not involve itself in operations that do not directly affect our vital national interests.  Although I understand why most Americans may not be willing to sacrifice their tax dollars, much less their sons and daughters, to save a few families in a remote African nation, and although I am merely another servicewoman in the face of thousands, I would propose an answer different to Senator McCain’s.  I believe there is a certain necessity to intervene where our vital national interests are not involved, but we must go about it carefully and deliberately, recognizing the costs are high while doing our best to reduce our losses.  However, if such interventions do and most likely will require the lives of my fellow soldiers, my only response to the fathers who must suffer these losses would be: “Sir—if I am ordered to risk my life so that children like Elisabeth’s can live in Rwanda as dignified human beings, I honestly cannot think of a more honorable cause for which to die.  And if the nation I choose to serve is one that refuses to turn its head as people across the world are unjustly killed, I certainly could not be more fortunate as to give my life for such a country.”